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Abstract 
Environmental security has been diligently examined in previous research on both 
subnational and multinational levels and have not found consensus on the contributing 
factors for why and how environmental conflict occurs. This thesis aims to contribute to 
this strand of research, more specifically asking if water scarcities effect the number of non-
state conflicts in Africa, depending on the quality of governments. The study suggests, that 
as freshwater resources gradually decreases the number of non-state conflicts increase, 
however that it is moderated by levels of corruption within governmental institutions. The 
research question has been examined and answered, utilizing a quantitative regression 
analysis comparing the change in freshwater resources in African countries, the amount of 
domestic non-state conflicts and levels of corruption within the time period of 1995-2016. 
The findings of this study demonstrate that there is no linear correlation between water 
scarcities and the amount of non-state conflicts in African countries, furthermore levels of 
corruption do not moderate this. On the other hand, the results have found that where there 
are water scarcities there is also a greater likelihood of non-state conflicts to occur if the 
governments of that country suffer high levels of corruption. Finally, this thesis provides a 
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1. Introduction  
 
The Senegal river flows along the border of Senegal and Mauritania, and the agricultural 
lands and farms located close by thrives and depends on it. Unfortunately, a devastating 
drought hit the region during the 1980s, and the value of land along the riverbank 
substantially increased. This resulted in upper-class Moors1 in Mauritania rewriting 
property legislation, driving black Mauritanian farmers off of their lands. Water and land 
conflicts continued to escalate, resulting in two Senegalese farmers being killed in the 
spring of 1989 by Mauritanian herders. This event sparked ethnic conflicts in both Senegal 
and Mauritania, resulting in hundreds of deaths, thousands wounded, deported and made 
homeless (Homer-Dixon, 1994). The Senegal river conflicts, paints the reality of how water 
scarcity can spark violence, and has not only occurred in the past, but is something that still 
occurs in Africa today.   
 
Traditionally peace and security studies have mainly focused on military warfare, nuclear 
weapons and arms control when addressing inter and intra-state conflicts2. However, in 
recent decades researchers have considered additional mechanisms that might aggravate 
conflicts, such as environmental security3 (Maystadt & Ecker, 2014; Evans, 2010; Uexkull, 
2014; Uexkull et al, 2016; Navas, 2018). This research is scattered amongst many different 
disciplines, analysing several different resources and regions, and has found that Africa is 
especially sensitive to scarcity in freshwater4. Because of this, Africa has been a common 
region to examine on how and why conflicts sometimes occur when there is less freshwater.  
This research has mainly been conducted on subnational levels, demonstrating that 
environmental degradation sometimes results in intra-state conflicts, further suggesting 
several conditional factors that can either mitigate or aggravate conflicts, such as economy, 






1 “Moors” refer to Muslim inhabitants in Maghreb.   
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Therefore, a number of theories exists from subnational studies on why and how conflicts 
sometimes occur when there are water scarcities, however not enough quantitative research 
has been conducted examining these theoretical claims. Studies that have examined this on 
a multinational level, investigates numerous factors that might aggravate or mitigate the 
likelihood of conflicts (Uexkull, 2014: Uexkull et al, 2016; Gizelis & Wooden, 2010). This 
strand of literature has however not found consensus on what contributing factors might 
increase the likelihood of conflicts in the occurrence of water scarcities, containing various 
explanations between contextual factors such as ethnicity, religion, politics and economy. 
Due to this lack of consensus in current research, the different theories are constantly 
argued and challenged.  
 
Some previous research conducted on a multinational level has provided special attention to 
the role of the governments in environmental conflicts. In 2010 Gizelis and Wooden 
published an article examining how water scarcities are connected to intra-state conflict 
depending on the democracy levels of states. Although the article was informative, it solely 
examined how democracy affects intra-state conflicts and did not include any further 
governmental indicators. Other researchers have pointed out the limitations of solely using 
democracy when examining governments (Deglow & Fjelde, 2019). Claiming that levels of 
democracy do not indicate holistically how governments are good or bad, and that there are 
further measures that indicate the quality of government that are equally as important. 
Alternative suggestions for measuring the quality of government have been provided by 
Rothstein, claiming that examining impartiality might be more useful when evaluating 
governments (Rothstein, 2008). The impartiality of a government, which is the fair equal 
treatment of all citizens by a state, can be evaluated through numerous ways. One rather 
powerful way to examine the impartiality are levels of corruption, as corruption is in its 
nature unfair and partial. Therefore, this thesis argues that it might be useful to conduct a 
similar study as that of Gizelis and Wooden (2010), but instead include alternative 
indicators on quality of government, that specifies levels of impartiality, such as the 
 
2 Inter-state conflicts occur between two or more states, intra-state conflicts rather address domestic conflicts 
between non-state or state actors within the borders of a country.  
3 “Environmental security” refers to when the environment is unthreatened and is able to provide people and 
animals with essential natural resources to thrive and survive.  
4 “Freshwater” (also called renewable freshwater resources) is all water that is found in rivers, underground and 
in lakes that is not saltwater or brackish water.  
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presence or absence of corruption. Additionally, the article by Gizelis and Wooden did not 
specify on what types of conflicts water scarcities might aggravate, other than that they tend 
to occur domestically. Thus, this thesis suggests that it may be important to examine 
whether water scarcities have a unique effect on non-state conflicts5 across Africa, since 
subnational case studies have indicated that non-state conflicts are more likely to occur 
when there is less freshwater (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Raleigh, 2010; Maystadt & Ecker, 
2014). Additionally, this study proposes to examine to which degree water scarcities affect 
non-state conflicts depending on the corruption levels of African countries, since corruption 
increases partiality towards citizens, thus aggravating conflicts.  
 
In summary, previous research has examined contextual factors of why inter-state conflicts 
occur when there is water scarcity, this research has however mainly focused on specific 
case studies providing a board selection of explanatory factors. Further research that has 
examined the link between water scarcity and inter-state conflicts through a quantitative 
method have dedicated special attention to the role of governments, although this strand of 
research has not yet included measurements of corruption. Furthermore, to my knowledge 
no quantitative study has examined how water scarcities effect specific types of conflict, 
such as conflict between non-state actors. Thus, this thesis has set out to examine if water 
scarcities affect the amount of non-state conflicts in Africa, and if this depends on levels of 
corruption within governments, utilizing a quantitative method. I argue that by doing this 
we will gain a more complete picture of what governmental characteristics help mitigate or 
aggravate conflict when environmental degradation causes water scarcity. My research 
question is therefore as follows: 
  
- Does water scarcity affect non-state conflicts to different degrees in Africa 




5 Non-state conflicts are a subcategory of intra-state conflicts that specifically refers to conflicts where only 
actors that are not a part of or a representative of the government participates. Participates may be extremist 




This study demonstrates through a quantitative analysis measuring change in freshwater 
resources, non-state conflicts and levels of corruption that there is no linear effect between 
water scarcities and non-state conflicts during the time period of 1995-2016. In other 
words, greater scarcity does not lead to an increased amount of non-state conflicts, only 
corruption alone showed a significant effect on the amount of non-state conflicts in African 
countries. However, in a complementary regression analysis, it was shown that the overall 
likelihood of non-state conflicts is greater in countries with any degree of water scarcities, 
but only where corruption is high. In conclusion, this thesis has shown that non-state 
conflicts do seem to rather occur in countries that experience water scarcities and that 
countries with lower levels of corruption are able to mitigate the likelihood of non-state 






















2. Previous research  
This chapter provides a summary of the previous literature. The first section discusses 
freshwater resources, how it is defined and different ways of measuring them. The second 
section discusses how natural resources might cause conflict, eventually narrowing down to 
how water scarcities can cause conflict. The final section describes how corruption can help 
to indicate quality of government and how it might aggravate conflict when there is water 
scarcity.  
 
2.1. Freshwater resources and scarcity 
A challenging task in the natural resource research field is how to define when there is 
scarcity in water resources, since consumption of water varies greatly between different 
countries. For example, a household in Sweden might be used to entirely different habits of 
using water than say a household in rural Nigeria. According to the UN-water entity of the 
United Nations (2020) the definition of water scarcity says:  
 
“Water scarcity can mean scarcity in availability of renewable freshwater due to physical 
shortage, or scarcity in access due to the failure of institutions to ensure a regular supply 
or due to a lack of adequate infrastructure” (UN-water entity, 2020).  
 
Since it is complicated to measure and determine when water resources are considered 
scarce, and the fact that there are no quantitative measurements appropriate for this thesis 
that indicate water scarcities, this thesis will have to use a proxy measure, and instead 
measure the increase or decrease in freshwater resources. Therefore, this study does address 
the decrease in freshwater as water scarcity, since a decrease in such a vital resource does 
require societies to readapt and experience a period of scarcity. Additionally, since this 
thesis focuses on environmental degradation and how it may cause conflict, it is appropriate 
to measure water resources that are impacted by environmental degradation. There are in 
general two types of water resources, the physical and economic. Physical water resources 
refer to the total freshwater availability in rivers, lakes and soils within a given region. 
Economic water resources on the other hand, refers to the infrastructural capacity of states 
9 
to provide citizens with water through pipelines and taps. (Petruzzello, 2019). Thus, for this 
thesis physical freshwater resources are more appropriate to measure, since it is primarily 
affected by environmental degradation. The decrease in freshwater resources can be caused 
by a number of factors, such as seasonal factors, population growth and changed weather 
patterns due to global warming. Therefore, the decline in freshwater is not entirely due to 
environmental degradation and climate change, however it is partially. According to the 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) around 1,2 billion people are today living in 
areas subjected to physical water scarcity due to the changing and extreme weathers 
patterns caused by climate change, and that water scarcities are expected to continue as 
global warming gets worse (Petruzzello, 2019).  
 
2.2 How freshwater resources are measured   
But how are freshwater resources measured? And which measure is more appropriate for 
the purpose of this study? In 2016 Taylor and Damkjaer published an extensive study on 
the existing measures on freshwater resources, analysing both their liability and qualities. 
According to their article, the most widely used measure for freshwater is the Water Stress 
Index (WSI). This measure utilizes inter alia something called the “Mean Annual River 
Runoff” (MARR) measure, which indicates freshwater resources that flows in rivers and 
lakes above ground level, however it does not measure groundwater. Rockström and 
Falkenmark (2015) pointed out that the WSI measure might be misleading as it does not 
take into account groundwater and soil moisture which is a large part of the freshwater 
resources in Sub-Saharan Africa, where up to 51 % of freshwater is found underground 
(Rockström & Falkenmark, 2015). Another widely used measure, is the Withdrawal-to-
availability ratio (WTA), this measure studies the total annual withdrawal per sector in 
relation to the available freshwater and can with this determine whether or not a country is 
water stressed. Similarly, this measure utilizes MARR and does not include soil moisture, 
which (as stated above) is an important indicator for measuring freshwater resources in 
Africa (Taylor & Damkjaer, 2016).  
 
Since both of the measurements mentioned above utilize MARR in order to compute 
metrics on freshwater resources, using these when examining water scarcity in Africa might 
be inadequate. Thus, if the measurement does not include groundwater, it is possible that 
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the obtained data doesn’t measure all freshwater resources and consequently produces a 
faulty result. However, a measurement that does account for above ground water as well as 
underground water is the “Internally Renewable Freshwater Resources per Capita” measure 
(IRFWR) which is also used in the study of Gizelis and Wooden (2010). This measurement 
does include both the average annual flow of rivers and soil moisture per capita within each 
country. The IRFWR measurement is the most fitting measurement of the analysis because 
it captures all freshwater resources in rivers, lakes and underground, which therefore 
indicates how fertile soil is for agricultural production in African countries. This causal link 
however will be more closely explained in the following chapter.  
 
2.3 Africa’s dependency on freshwater resources 
The agricultural industry is very important for Africans, as it keeps two thirds of the 
African population employed and additionally makes up for 30-60 percent of the GDP in 
most African states (Britannica, 2020). The African agricultural industries produce 
primarily principal grains, such as corn, wheat and rice, which is important for both 
domestic consumption and exports. Additionally, Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique are 
large tea exporters; for example, in 2010 Kenya alone accounted for 32 percent of the 
global exports of black tea. For producing coffee, Ethiopia is the seventh largest coffee 
producer in Africa, followed by Uganda and Cote d’Ivoire (Britannica, 2020). Agriculture 
is however important for African countries to different degrees. For example, countries 
such as Botswana lives mainly off of their mining industry for national revenues, still 
almost half of the Botswana population relies on the agricultural industry for their main 
occupation. Additionally, Burkina Faso is an Agri-economic state, where most citizens are 
more or less dependent on farming for their livelihoods, where the cotton industry is one of 
the primary economic sources for Burkina Faso and provides work for over 3 million 
citizens (OECD/FAO, 2016). This indicates, that it is important to keep in mind when 
examining how dependent African citizens are on agriculture, to rather focus on the 
percentage of Africans employed in the agricultural sector and not on national revenues or 




In summary, since the agri-business is important to many African states, it carries a heavy 
weight and importance in both the civil and national economy thus the occurrence of 
drought has high potential to cause conflict in Africa. But how do water scarcities affect 
societies in Africa? Since the agricultural industry is very important, water scarcities can 
cause a domino effect of consequences. To illustrate this, an example will be presented on 
how water scarcities have caused conflict in Somalia.   
 
2.4 The case of Somalia  
In 2011 The Intergovernmental Panel on climate change reported that due to irregular 
seasonal rainfall, Somalia has experienced its most severe drought in over 50 years. At its 
worst the drought resulted in famine causing 4 million Somalis in need of urgent help. 
Since approximately two-thirds of the Somali population lives in rural areas, farming and 
other agricultural work is the main source of livelihood. As drought hit rural areas of 
Somalia, large migration waves forced people to move elsewhere. The widespread poverty 
caused by drought and lack of employment as agri-businesses suffered, further encouraged 
the development of extremist’s groups like Al-Shabab. A concrete example of this would be 
the famine of 2011-2012 in Somalia, where a representative of the United Nations Refugee 
Agency in Somalia stated;  
 
“This famine has been a boon for Al-Shabaab’s recruitment campaign because when you 
don’t have purchasing power to buy the food, you will be encouraged to be recruited 
because then you will be saved, and you can use your salary or you will be given food” 
(Maystadt & Ecker, 2014, p. 1162).  
 
Both drought and civil conflict has become more common in Somalia in recent years, for 
example between 1997 and 2009, most outbreaks of violence occurred during times of 
severe drought, peaking in 2003-2004 and 2007-2009. The increase of conflicts seems to 
have overlapped with periods of intense water scarcity and higher temperatures (Maystadt 
& Ecker, 2014). In summary, the case of Somalia demonstrates how poor and victimized 
farmers suffer as their livelihood is taken away due to water scarcities and that this can 
encourage citizens to join extremist groups causing an increase in non-state conflicts. But 
conflicts do not always surface when water resources are lacking, previous research has 
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diligently tried to explain why conflict occurs in certain states when resources are low and 
































3. Previous research on natural resources and conflict  
The following chapter aims to map out the previous research that addresses the connection 
between natural resources and conflict, beginning with generally discussing natural 
resources and towards the end narrowing down to how water scarcities affect conflict.  
 
3.1 The (Neo) Malthusian Theory 
Research on how natural resources can cause conflict has been present since the 18th 
century. In his essay “The principle of the population” Thomas Malthus claims that as the 
population of the world increases, natural resources will not satiate people creating poverty, 
famine and war. One way to prevent this imbalance are preventative checks, such as family 
planning, late marriages and celibacy (Mellos, 1988). In more current literature, this theory 
has been reapplied onto the modern circumstances by the Neo-Malthusian school, claiming 
that resource scarcities and conflict occurs due to over-consumption, environmental 
degradation and technological expansion, instead of solely focusing on the population. The 
Neo-Malthusian school departs somewhat from the original Malthusian school, as it 
suggests other ways natural resources can last longer, such as increased sustainability 
(Mellos, 1988). The Neo-Malthusian school today shapes numerous studies in the 
temporary resource-related conflict research. And has formed two general research fields, 
the environmental security theory and the common property management theory (Turner, 
2004).  
 
The environmental security theory  
The environmental security theory creates a rather direct link between conflicts and 
resource scarcity and does not pay too much attention to interlaying factors, such as the 
actions of governments. One much recognized scholar of the environmental security 
perspective is Homer-Dixon who in his article from 1994 examined the connection between 
environmental scarcities and violent conflict. He explains that there are three main sources 
for resource-related conflict; Environmental change, population growth and unequal 
distribution, but he does not provide an explanation to what these mechanisms are 
empirically. Homer-Dixon does however suggest that the likelihood of environmental 
scarcity causing conflict is more likely in poor states, since the institutions are not resilient 
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enough to handle scarcity, and that this forces citizens to utilize violent conflict in order to 
survive, this was claimed to be understudied and in need for further examination. 
Additionally, Homer-Dixon states that it is important to distinguish the different resources 
and what types of conflict they trigger. He suggests that inter-state wars concern non-
renewable resources rather than renewable resources. This is because petroleum, coal or 
other minerals can be faster converted into power, such as fuelling armies. On the other 
hand, agricultural resources such as land, forests and freshwater rather tends to trigger intra-
state conflicts between regions and groups of people, and that the one renewable resource 
that is more prone to trigger non-state conflicts is freshwater, since it is very vital and 
important for people’s everyday life (Homer-Dixon, 1994).  
 
The common property management theory  
This theory similarly believes that environmental conflicts are mainly resource scarcity 
driven, and that these conflicts rather occur in resource-poor rural areas. However, the 
common property theory rather focuses on examining common properties and claims that 
the ill-governed natural resources that are openly available for all is causing unsustainable 
competition. This competition eventually leads to scarcity of the natural resources, resulting 
in conflict. The common property theory states that poor governance and lack of regulation 
of the common natural resources stems from inadequate institutions that fail to insure equal 
distribution amongst its citizens (Turner, 2004). Much of the common property theories are 
inspired by the works of Garett Hardin, who in his article “The tragedy of the commons” 
(1968) discusses overpopulation, the high demand for natural resources and the need for 
states to start organising a sustainable way to utilize resources. He claims that as the 
population rises, the need for equal distribution and restriction by governments is important 
for the safekeeping of the environment. Scholars have further built on the theories of 
Hardin, diving into more case-specific examinations on the role of institutions for 
regulating common property. Runge (1986) adds to the hypothesis of Hardin claiming that 
governments need to centralise rules and regulations surrounding the utilization of common 
natural resources rather than privatizing them, since the risk of corruption will become 
greater if resources are privatized.  
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Furthermore, Painter, Sumberg and Price (1994) also contributed by examining the 
effectiveness of the Terroir Villages policies in the Sahel states6. The Terroir Villages is a 
set of development policies, advocated by foreign non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and Western governments, which was introduced in 1974 when drought affected most of 
the Sahel states. The article argued that the reason the Terroir Villages policy measures 
were unsuccessful and ineffective was due to its European-contexed framework, not being 
adapted to the culture of the agriculturalists and pastoralists of the Sahel’s states. This 
caused policy misfit and inadequate governance of the properties which eventually resulted 
in mild conflicts. This article showed how faulty property management, can cause disputes 
and grievances in societies.  
 
To summarize, within the Neo-Malthusian school both the environmental security theory 
and the common property management theory have consensus regarding what types of 
natural resources seem to trigger certain types of conflicts. Firstly, Homer Dixon suggests 
that renewable resources such as freshwater may trigger non-state conflicts between 
farmers within agricultural industries. And secondly, the common property management 
theory almost exclusively examines how common properties in farming contexts affect 
conflicts between agricultural workers and is therefore also mainly focusing on renewable 
natural resources. The idea that different types of natural resources cause different types of 
conflicts is further supported by the resource curse theory (Ross, 2015). This theory points 
out that certain natural resources rather tend to cause conflicts when there are more of them, 
such as diamond’s or oil, and that natural resources that rather cause conflicts when they are 
scarce are renewable resources such as freshwater. However, exactly how and which 
renewable resources effect conflicts is far from settled in current literature according to 





6 The “Sahel States” refers to a specific ecoclimatic part of Africa that is the part of the continent where the 
desert climate transitions into the savanna’s climate typical for the south. The area of this semi-arid climate 
stretches from the west coast to the east of the continent, including parts of the northern Senegal, Southern 
Mauritania and Mali, the southern parts of Algeria and Niger, and the extreme norths of South Sudan, Ethiopia 
and Eritrea.  
16 
Additional previous literature that examines these theories is the works of Uexkull et al. 
(Uexkull, 2014; Uexkull et al, 2016). Regarding freshwater and conflict, Uexkull 
demonstrates how regions within sub-Saharan Africa that depend on rainfed agriculture are 
at higher risk for civil conflict when there is drought (Uexkull, 2014). She also reveals that 
regional drought is more likely to cause intra-state conflict rather than inter-state conflict 
but does not provide a deeper description on what types of conflicts tend to occur when 
water is scarce (Uexkull, 2014). Also, Uexkull et al. (2016) conducts an actor-oriented 
analysis that also accounts for socioeconomic contextual factors in Africa and Asia. The 
study demonstrates that drought in general does not cause more conflict but does so for 
certain socio-economic groups that are more vulnerable to civil conflict due to being 
politically excluded and vulnerable. The study showed that under certain conditions, these 
groups ran a greater risk of experiencing conflicts, due to being more dependent on natural 
resources for their livelihood, and that this was largely affected by the sensitivity of that 
ecosystem and the groups’ coping capacity. This coping capacity refers to the levels of 
socio-economic development of that region, their history of conflicts and their limited 
access to economic and societal capital. The conflicts that were included in the analysis of 
this study however, only measured state vs non-state actors, and did not measure conflicts 
where solely non-state actors are involved. In addition to these findings, Uexkull et al. 
concluded that civil conflicts between the governments and civil groups are more likely to 
occur in underdeveloped regions with marginalized groups, and that this societal instability 
increases the risk of conflicts to occur when there is drought. However, they also point out 
that this societal instability needs to be further examined (Uexkull et al, 2016). Other 
previous literature examining the link between natural resources and conflicts, has 
additionally added further factors and multidimensional reasons for conflicts occurring. The 
following chapter maps out previous research that focuses on the injustice of ecological 
distribution7 and how partiality and unfairness is the main driver for scarcity conflicts: 





7 Ecological distribution refers to when ecological and environmental benefits or costs are distributed unequally, 
thus consequently causing conflict.  
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3.2 Political ecology   
The field of political ecology similarly examines the mechanisms causing resource related 
conflicts however takes into account deeper cultural and social factors. Since its first 
appearance in a study conducted by Basset in 1988 examining herder-peasant conflicts on 
the Ivory coast, the discipline has incorporated more and more perspectives and methods 
into its field (Le Billon, 2015). The field of political ecology departs somewhat from the 
previously explained Neo-Malthusian approach, by claiming that environmental conflict 
does not solely occur due to the environment, but also due to pre-existing social structures 
and conflicts, where resources and environment trigger them. In 2004 Turner addressed the 
existing environmental conflict studies and how they mainly examine material dimensions 
of conflicts. He claimed that the failure of institutions when managing drought does trigger 
conflict, but that there are also cultural divisions and moral borders among the agro-pastoral 
communities that aggravate conflicts (Turner, 2004). Further, Escobar (2006) provides a 
deeper dive into the ownership of governments in environmental conflict. He explains that 
since the environment is essential for workers’ livelihoods to financially keep themselves 
stable, the inequality of the ecological distribution harms citizens economically. And that 
the cultural marginalization and hierarchical structures deprive certain minorities and 
groups from the right to use and live in nature based on their own cultural beliefs. He 
suggests that a partial solution to the environmental conflicts is increased equality within 
key state institutions that manage policy regarding property rights, ecological distribution 
and economic organization. He also suggests that a more plural knowledge on culture and a 
greater impartiality within a state’s institution is important to avoid conflict (Escobar, 
2006).  
 
Another article which suggests that democratic and fair institutions will mitigate the 
likelihood of intra-state conflicts, is the article of Gizelis and Wooden (2010). Their study 
examined if freshwater resources and conflicts correlate depending on the democracy levels 
of governments, theorizing that the higher the democracy level is, the better governments 
can handle grievances and distribution of natural resources once they are scarce. They 
found that there is no direct link between water scarcities and intra-state conflicts, however 
that there is some correlation in autocratic states, but not in democratic states. These 
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findings show that the quality of governance can be important in how water scarcities affect 
society and the conflicts that occur due to them. Gizelis and Wooden further suggest that 
more attention and research should be provided on states’ governance and how it might 
mitigate environmental conflicts. In their article, Gizelis and Wooden used the Polity_2 
measurement (Jaggers & Gurr, 1995) in order to evaluate the democracy levels of the 
countries included in their analysis. Using the Polity_2 measurement for analysing 
governments has however since then been criticized. Deglow and Fjelde (2019) claim that 
the Polity_2 measurement might be misleading as it creates a spectrum of scores that ranges 
from total autocracy to total democracy, risking that vastly different types of governments 
are given the same democracy scores. Additionally, in a study by Povitkina (2018) she 
questions how relevant democracy is for the performance in environmental and 
sustainability policy, and rather suggests an increased interest in governmental quality when 
examining states. Quality of government (QOG) addresses the impartiality of a 
government, meaning the fair and equal treatment of citizens, and therefore inter alia 
evaluates control of corruption, effective bureaucratic administrations and rule of law. 
Povitkina shows that the democracy of states only correlates with better environmental 
performance if the quality of government is satisfactory, thus demonstrating that the 
governmental quality is equally as important to evaluate when looking at the performance 
of states. The following chapter will more closely explain quality of government and what 
it entails, and further argue why it is relevant to include in this analysis on how water 














4. Quality of Government and corruption  
 
A government interacts with their citizens through two dimensions. First, trough the input 
dimension, which refers to the democratic input by citizens into the state, and second trough 
the output dimension which refers to the actions and services that are provided to the 
citizens by the government. In the output dimension, the manner that power is exercised is 
indicated, thus consequently the quality of government. According to Rothstein (2008) the 
output is more satisfactory for the majority of citizens, if the condition of impartiality is 
fulfilled. The impartiality of the output dimension, meaning the fairness and equality in 
distribution of goods and services, makes sure that the government is providing citizens 
with equal treatment and opportunities. According to Rothstein: 
 
“When implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take into 
consideration anything about the citizen/case that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy 
or the law” (Rothstein, 2008, p. 170).  
 
A good example of impartiality in the output dimension would be the recruitment system 
for the administrative agencies of a government. Say that an agency for social workers 
recruits their employees based on pre-stipulated qualifications, and that all applicants are 
considered based on their education, merits and experience. This would be regarded as an 
impartial recruitment process provided by the government to its citizens so that everyone 
has the same opportunities to become employed. However, if the recruitment process would 
instead hire social workers based on their clientelist contacts, bribes or ethnic heritage, then 
this would be viewed as a partial recruitment system (Rothstein, 2008). Impartiality within 
governments can be examined through many different areas and indicators, one of them is 
level of corruption. Oskar Kurer defined corruption in the following sense;  
 
“Corruption involves a holder of public office who is violating the impartiality principle in 
order to achieve private gain” (Kurer, 2005, p. 30).  
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Thus, the presence of corruption within a state’s institutions, provides a rather strong 
indicator whether a government lacks impartiality or not. Corruption is not only unfair and 
partial, it also often affects several parts of a government, harming the impartiality of 
several sectors simultaneously and therefore further being a very useful indicator of 
impartiality. Bo Rothstein does however point out, that once corruption is considered absent 
from an institution, there is not necessarily complete impartiality, but that even if say 
financial or recruitment processes are fair, there is always a presence of discrimination 
against people based on gender or background e.g.  
Even though the absence of corruption does not guarantee total impartiality, the principles 
of non-corruption is, as Kurer (2005) puts it, that “A state ought to treat those who deserve 
equally” which fits into the definition of quality of government and the impartiality 
principal, that a state should treat all equally in its actions of governance.  
 
4.1 How corruption aggravates or mitigates conflicts when there is water 
scarcity   
But how does corruption within governmental institutions affect the outcome of conflict 
when there are water scarcities? Since corruption decreases the impartiality within 
governmental institutions, it then causes governmental institutions to conduct unequal and 
unfair treatment against its citizens. According to Kurer (2005), corruption is when 
authorities exercise power for the benefit of private gain, which then removes resources 
from the general public, especially for marginalized groups. As previously explained, the 
agricultural sector is an important industry in Africa and many workers depend on it for 
their livelihoods. Thus, as there is less freshwater the agricultural industry suffers, causing 
crop failure and thus consequently affects the financial situation, pushing people into 
poverty and vulnerability. This further causes grievances, poverty and social exclusion, that 
put people in positions where they need to find livelihoods or aid elsewhere. If 
governmental institutions are corrupt, the treatment and resource distribution is unfair and 
unequal, leaving large groups of people socio-economically vulnerable and exposed. 
Additionally, in corrupt states, elitist groups tend to have a greater opportunity to access 
social and economic capital, such as job opportunities or financial help, while marginalized 
groups may not have the same possibilities (Uexkull et al, 2016). 
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Escobar (2006) states that an unequal ecological distribution pushes certain marginalized 
groups further into poverty and that this causes increased grievances and frustrations 
amongst them. Recalling the example of Somalia, this argument is further empirically 
supported where many of the new recruits of the Al-Shahab extremist group, were poor and 
affected farmers that had lost their land or fertile soil, partially due to drought. With no 
other job opportunities available due to being politically vulnerable, joining Al-Shabab was 
necessary in order to survive. The weak and corrupt intuitions of Somalia, where not able to 
mitigate the consequences that the drought brought, thus people could not seek help 
elsewhere. Corruption combined with drought causes poverty, and poverty causes 
vulnerability and desperation, which eventually cause frustration and lastly increase 
conflicts. Thus, if governments have high levels of corruption and with this low level of 
impartiality, this entails that the authority within these institutions are exercising power for 
private gain. This consequently affects the quality of governance and civil services that are 
carried out for the good of all citizens, thus aid and other services are most likely not 


















5. Theoretical framework and hypothesis  
In this chapter the theoretical framework will be presented. The first section will explain the 
research question, hypothesis and the theoretical framework. The second section will 
illustrate the causal chain and lastly repeat the hypothesis for clarity.  
 
5.1 How water scarcities effect non-state conflicts depending on 
corruption  
The aim of this study is to examine whether there is a connection between water scarcities 
and non-state conflicts depending on the levels of corruption in African states. Based on 
previous research, this study assumes that renewable natural resources, such as freshwater 
is more likely to cause domestic non-state conflicts, rather than international war (Ross, 
2015; Homer-Dixon, 1994). Thus, as freshwater is reduced in quantity, it is believed that 
the amount of non-state conflicts increases (Turner, 2004; Maystadt & Ecker, 2014; Detges, 
2016). This thesis also intends to examine whether high or low levels of corruption mitigate 
or aggravate the likelihood of non-state conflicts occurring when there is water scarcity, 
since previous research has indicated that quality of government such as levels of 
democracy have a moderating effect on the likelihood of conflict when there is less water 
(Gizelis & Wooden, 2010). However solely measuring democracy when examining 
governments has been questioned by previous research, suggesting that the quality of 
governments is equally important to take into account (Povitkina, 2018; Rothstein, 2008). 
In the works of Turner (2006) and Escobar (2006) it is suggested that contributing factors 
for conflicts to occur is low quality of governmental institutions, and that as key-institutions 
within governments are unfair and impartial towards certain cultural and ethnic groups, 
conflicts are aggravated in between them. In 2008, Bo Rothstein further addressed that 
when measuring impartiality in governments, levels of corruption is a powerful indicator 
(Rothstein, 2008).  
 
Therefore, this thesis sets out to conduct a similar analysis as that of Gizelis and Wooden 
(2010), however, instead replaces the debated democracy measure with levels of corruption. 
Corruption is believed to affect the likelihood of conflicts in the sense that it permeates 
several dimensions and parts of society that harms the equal and fair treatments of all 
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citizens, aggravating grievance and conflicts when financial hardships are caused by 
freshwater scarcity. This premise is further supported in the works of Uexkull et al. (2016), 
as their study suggests that conflict is more likely to occur in development countries that are 
dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods, especially for marginalized groups who are 
politically excluded. Thus, this study suggests that as corruption is more present, 
governments will exercise power for private gain or certain elitist groups rather than the 
general population, and that this affects their capability and managements skills to mitigate 
conflicts and aid people that are pushed into poverty due to water scarcity. Additionally, 
several previous studies (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Turner, 2004; Gizelis & Wooden, 2010; 
Uexkull et al, 2016), have indicated that when renewable natural resources decrease, such 
as freshwater, this rather affects intra-state conflicts, but they do not deeper examine what 
types of conflict these are. To my knowledge, no quantitative analysis has examined how 
freshwater affects uniquely non-state conflicts, where on the other hand plenty of sub-
national case-studies have indicated that conflict between different professions or ethnic 
groups are aggravated when there is less water. Thus, the research question this thesis is as 
follows; Does water scarcities affect non-state conflicts to different degrees in Africa 
depending on corruption? Furthermore, the hypothesis attached to this research question is; 
H1: As water scarcities increase, states with low corruption experience less non-state 


















                                                                                 
 






H1: As water scarcities increase, states with low corruption experience less non-state 
























6. Research design   
The following chapter will present the dependent, independent and control variables. The 
first section describes the main variables utilized for this analysis, being non-state conflicts, 
freshwater resources, and the moderating variable being levels of corruption. The second 
part will describe the selected control variables, and lastly limitations and scope of the data 
will be discussed.  
 
6.1 Operationalization of the main dependent and independent variables  
The main independent variable provides metrics on freshwater, called the “Internally 
Renewable Freshwater Resources per Capita, In cubic meters” (IRFWR). It indicates the 
average annual flow of rivers and the recharge of groundwater within a country’s borders, 
and thus indicates physical freshwater resources. The data is obtained from the World Bank 
“Development Indicators” dataset (2020) and provides data for all African states excluding 
Seychelles, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan and Sao Tome Principe since their data 
was missing. The freshwater data is obtained for the years of 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012 
and have been calculated into averages of freshwater resources in between 1997 and 2002 
and then the same for 2007 and 2012. Afterwards, the later average has been subtracted 
from the first average, thus calculating the change in freshwater resources between 1997-
2002 and 2007-2012, showing if freshwater has decreased or increased over time.  The 
reason that the data is aggregated into a cross-sectional analysis instead of a time series 
analysis, is due to the freshwater data only being available in certain points of time. 
Additionally, a robustness check has been carried out for this variable. This has been done 
by recoding all the positive values in the freshwater variable into 0, thus only measuring the 
negative changes in freshwater resources and then compared them with the amount of non-
sate conflicts. This has been done in order to control if the effect on non-state conflicts are 







The dependent variable is non-state conflicts, which are expected to change as the amount 
of freshwater resources changes. This data is from the “Uppsala Conflict Data Program” 
(UCDP) more specifically from the “Non-state Conflicts dataset 20.1” that provides the 
number of non-state conflicts per country per year, within the time frame of 1995-2016. 
The Non-state conflicts dataset defines conflict with the following definition; “The use of 
armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a 
state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year.” (Sundberg, Eck & 
Kreutz, 2012, p. 3). Additionally, the non-state conflict data has been complemented with a 
“kick”, where the 0s have been replaced with 1 in order to log the conflict variable. This is 
important since the variation in the number of conflicts between the African states is very 
dispersed, and also since there is quite a large number of zeros in the conflicts data causing 
the distribution to become skew.  
 
6.2 Operationalization of the moderating variable  
The moderating variable is an indicator of corruption. The data is obtained from the Word 
Bank dataset from the “Global Governance Indicators” (2020) where the variable used is 
called “Control for corruption, estimate”. More specifically the corruption data indicates the 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption. The estimate provides countries with aggregated 
scores ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, where a lower value indicates more corruption. The 
corruption data is obtained for the years of 2002-2012, where an average of the control of 
corruption scores for this time period has been calculated in order to create one variable for 
the analysis. This specific time period has been chosen as it is believed that the corruption 
levels in this time period has had the most effect on the amount of non-state conflicts. 
Additionally, this variable has also been made into a dichotomized variable in order to 
conduct an interaction analysis. This has been carried out by calculating the mean of the 
corruption scores amongst all African states, afterwards countries with corruption values 
beneath this mean have received a “0” in the dichotomized variable, representing the 
countries with a high level of corruption. Thus, the countries with a corruption value above 




6.3 Operationalization of the control variables   
The first control variable included in the analysis measures states democracy levels, via the 
Polity_2 indicator, more specifically called “Revised combined polity score” from the 
Quality of Government (QOG) Standard Cross-Section dataset. Since Gizelis and Wooden 
(2010) used this indicator in their analysis, and since this thesis aims to complement their 
study, the democracy levels are included to avoid omitted variable bias. The Polity_2 data 
measures democracy scores for each state by ranging them on a democracy-authority 
spectrum with values ranging from -10 to 10, where a negative value indicates less 
democracy and a positive value indicates more. This indicator of democracy evaluates inter 
alia elections and their competitiveness and openness, the possibility for citizens to 
participate in politics and to what extent authorities are held accountable. The second 
control variable is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita measured in US dollars, 
which is also obtained from the QOG standard dataset, and is more specifically called 
“GDP per capita (current US dollar)”. The GDP is included as it might affect the capacity 
of states to actually mitigate conflicts and/or can actually be a cause for states experiencing 
more violence, thus this is also included. The third control variable measures the percentage 
of people employed in the agricultural sector in each African state. The data is from the 
QOG standard dataset and is called “Employment in agriculture (% of total employment)”, 
this variable more specifically measures all individuals who work with agriculture or in 
some way sell or profit from their commodities. This control variable is included since 
previous research has shown that water scarcities and conflicts tend to have a closer 
correlation in countries where citizens are more dependent on agriculture and therefore 











6.4 Limitations and scope  
Firstly, the IRFWR variable for freshwater does measure both ground and river water, 
however it does not provide us with information on when the amounts of water are 
considered scarce or abundant. Because of this the study instead examines how non-state 
conflicts are affected as freshwater resources change, using this as a proxy measure for 
water scarcities. This is indeed a limitation in the analysis, as the dataset does not provide a 
more specific threshold of when the freshwater resources are considered scarce or not. 
Therefore, this study has assumed that countries with a negative change in freshwater 
resources have experienced water scarcity. An advantage however with utilizing this 
measurement for water resources, is the fact that it measures the physical water resources 
rather than the economic resources, which allows this analysis to measure water that is 
primarily impacted by climate change. If this study instead would measure the economic 
water resources the efficacy of the government would largely be intertwined with the water 
resource data. Additionally, by not choosing to measure economic water resources the study 
avoids measuring water that is largely a function of the government’s efficiency and thus 
making it easier to examine if water has an independent effect on conflicts. Another 
limitation considering the freshwater data, is the fact that this variable is a count-variable, 
typically when conducting a linear regression analysis utilizing a count-variable one would 
use a different method other than the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), e.g. Poisson. 
However, with a limited understanding and knowledge within the quantitative method field, 
there is a risk of conducting the analysis incorrectly by doing this. Regarding the 
dichotomized regression analysis carried out in table 3, previous research has questioned if 
it’s appropriate to use a binary dependent variable in an OLS linear regression analysis. 
However, in an article by Hellevik (2009) two analyses were conducted comparing how the 
results varied between an OLS analysis and a logistics regression analysis using a binary 







Furthers limitations concern the “Non-state Conflict” data. The conflict variable in itself is 
limited as it does only measure non-state conflicts, with some states having a total of 20 
conflicts in the past 30 years, while some states record 0 conflicts. This becomes a 
limitation since conflicts where governments are involved are not included, and therefore 
risking to not demonstrate a correct picture of the actual violence in African states. There is 
indeed data available on UCDP where non-state vs government actors-conflicts are 
measured, however this was not included in this study for several reasons. First, the format 
of the data was not structured in the desired way, making it hard to easily add it into the 
dataset used for this analysis. Thus, not enough time was left to look for options to get 
around this problem in order to include this conflict data. Secondly, a majority of previous 
literature examining the link between intra-state conflicts and water scarcities had solely 
included non-state actor’s vs governments in their analysis (Gizelis & Wooden, 2010; 
Uexkull, 2014; Uexkull et al, 2016). Thus, it was determined that it would be interesting to 
examine how freshwater resources uniquely effect non-state conflicts, as many of the case-
studies claimed that this was one rather common type of conflict to occurs when there is 

















7. Results  
In this chapter the results of the regression analysis will be presented. Firstly, some 
descriptive statistics demonstrate the qualities of the data used in this study. Second, a 
scatter plot is provided of the bivariate analysis using the freshwater variable and non-state 
conflicts. Finally, the main regression analysis using all variables will be presented and 
additionally a complementary analysis using dichotomized variables will be displayed.  
 
 


















In the table above the descriptive statistics are illustrated. In the first column “N”, the 
number of countries used in the analysis are demonstrated, which is 48. The states that are 
excluded have been so due to lacking data in one or more variables. For the first variable, 
non-state conflicts are presented. In the minimum column, it is important to remember that 
the minimum conflicts are actually 0 however I have replaced the 0 with a 1, which has 
been explain in chapter 6.1. Secondly, the freshwater variable demonstrates the total 
increase or decrease in freshwater resources per African country between the time period of 
1997 and 2012. The freshwater data is measured in cubic meters per capita, however, the 
number of cubic meters of freshwater per capita is a very large number, therefore the 
freshwater resources have been divided by 1 million, this allows the freshwater data to be 
                                              N         Minimum           Maximum          Mean          Standard Deviation     
 
Non-state conflicts               48           1.00                      104.0             8.6250              19.802889 
Change in freshwater           48          -3642.48              7520.10         -372.2989           2033.567113 
Levels of Corruption            48          -1.82                     1.09                -.7061                  .63306 
GDP in Dollars                    48           2.82                     96.82             21.4490               23.01800                          
Polity_2                                48           -9                         10                   3.02                    4.949  
% employed in Agri             48            6                         92                   47.59                  22.806  
 
Valid N                                48 
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presented in smaller numbers. The freshwater variable measures the largest decrease in 
freshwater resources and the largest increase in freshwater resources, therefore the 
minimum category measures -3642 cubic meters per capita and the maximum reads 7520 
cubic meters per capita. The third variable is the moderating corruption variable, which 
measures the average corruption scores for each country between the time period of 2002 to 
2012. In general, most African countries have quite a low value in control of corruption, the 
minimum being -1.82 and the maximum being 1.09. As mentioned previously, a lower 
value in the corruption variable indicates a high level of corruption in that respective 
country, thus the descriptive demonstrate that most African states are experiencing some 
degree of corruption. The fourth variable is the control variable that measures countries 
GDP in US dollars per capita. This variable was initially provided in thousands of dollars, 
however for the sake of interpreting the GDP data easily, it has been divided with 100, 
explaining the low values. The fifth variable is the Polity_2 measure which examines the 
democracy levels of African states. This variable provides each state with a score of their 
democracy levels ranging from -10 to 10. The Polity_2 descriptive ranges between a quite 
varied spectrum amongst the 48 states, where the lowest value is -9 and the highest score is 
10. Lastly, the final control variable is the “% employed in Agri”, representing the 
“Employment in agriculture (% of total employment)” indicator, which is included to 
control for spurious correlations. In the descriptive table it is clear that the state with the 
lowest percentage of citizens hired within the agricultural sector has 6 % while the country 


















The chart above illustrates the increase or decrease in freshwater resources in African 
countries within the time period of 1997 to 2012. On the y-axis the freshwater resources in 
cubic meters are presented, and on the x-axis, the African countries are displayed. In this 
graph two observations are interesting for this thesis, first is that the countries that have 
experienced an increase in freshwater resources reach into larger amounts than the countries 
on the minus scale. However, the amount of countries that have had a decrease in 









Above, the total number of non-state conflicts between 1995-2016 in each African country 
is presented. The states with no numbers have had 0 non-state conflicts detected. In the 
graph it is apparent that very few countries have experienced high numbers of conflicts. 
The graph also demonstrates that Congo Democratic Republic, Kenya and Nigeria have 
experienced the most conflicts within this time period, while many African countries have 




















Graph 3: Scatter plot of a bivariate analysis with change in freshwater 
and non-state conflicts   
 
The figure above demonstrates a scatter plot analysis on change in freshwater resources and 
the total amount of non-state conflicts between 1995-2016. The x-axis demonstrates the 
freshwater resources and the y-axis show the non-state conflicts. The scatter plot clearly 
illustrates that there is no linear correlation between conflict and water scarcities, however 
countries that do have conflicts also seem to have experienced scarcity. This either indicates 
that there is no effect on conflicts by freshwater resources or that there are intermediate 








Table 2: Multiple regression analysis with change in freshwater, Non-










Table 5: Multiple regression analysis on freshwater and conflicts, 
















The table above demonstrates the multiple regression analysis of freshwater resources, non-
state conflicts and control variables. The 6 models demonstrate 6 separate regression 
analyses, where the variables have been gradually added in each model. In model 1 solely 
non-state conflicts and freshwater resources have been included in a bivariate regression 
analysis, where the coefficients do indicate a negative effect on conflicts as water increases, 
however the result is not significant thus the coefficient might as well be 0. In model 2 the 
corruption measure has been added to the regression, similarly, indicating no significant 
effect by freshwater on non-state conflicts, however corruption has a strongly significant 
and negative effect on conflicts. This pattern continues throughout the models, with all the 
                         Model:             1                 2                 3                 4                  5                  6    
Variables: 
Change in freshwater           -.062          -.011          -.011            .006              -.074           -.161 
Levels of Corruption                              -.848**      -.846*         -1.074**       -1.287***        
GDP in Dollars                                                          -.003           -.338             -.264            -.390 
% employed in Agri                                                                      -.747              -.805            -714 
Polity_2                                                                                                                .627             .288  
Dummy_Low_Corruption                                                                                                     -1.337** 
Freshwater*Low_Corruption                                                                                                .144 
 
 
Constant                            .850***        .263             .272         3.733             2.048             4.444 
N                                          48                48                 48           48                   48                  48 
Adjusted R                       -.020             .119              .099         .143               .185              .147 
R Square                            .001             .157              .157         .216               .272              .256 
 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***<0.001                                                                                                                                        





























control variables added in models 3-5, none of them increase the effect of freshwater on 
conflicts.  
 
Thus, in order to closer examine how freshwater effects conflicts depending on levels of 
corruption, an interaction variable has been added. This interaction variable now includes a 
dichotomized version of the corruption variable and the freshwater variable, the results of 
the interaction analysis is demonstrated in model 6. This model now demonstrates the effect 
that freshwater has separately in countries with high levels of corruption and low levels of 
corruption. The interaction analysis shows the effect freshwater resources have on conflicts 
in countries with high levels of corruption in the “Change in freshwater” variable, which is 
-.161, however this is not a significant result and therefore could might as well be 0. The 
effect that freshwater resources have on conflicts in countries with low levels of corruption 
is now visible in both the “Change in freshwater” variable and the interaction term 
“Freshwater*Low_Corruption”, however they first have to be added with one another. 
Thus, the effect that freshwater has on non-state conflicts in states with low corruption 
levels is -.017, this result is however also not significant.  
 
The results in the multiple regression analysis above does not seem to correspond to with 
scatter plot in graph 3, where it shows some correlation between countries that have 
experienced conflicts and water scarcities. However, the regression analysis show that there 
is no correlation between freshwater and non-state conflicts when both are measured as 
continuous variables. However, it is still plausible that there is a connection between 
freshwater and non-state conflicts, only rather indicating that where there are non-state 
conflicts there are also water scarcities and that maybe levels of corruption can either 
encourage or decrease the likelihood of this being the case. Thus, in the following table an 
analysis is conducted where the freshwater variable and non-state conflicts have been 












Table 3: Dichotomous analysis with freshwater, non-state conflicts, 






















Above, results from the analysis using dichotomized variables is presented. In model 1 only 
freshwater and non-state conflicts are included and seem to follow the same pattern as the 
regression with the undichotomized measures, showing that freshwater resources have 0 
effect on non-state conflicts. In model 2 the dichotomized variable of corruption is 
included, and also demonstrate 0 effect, however corruption has a negative and significant 
effect on non-state conflicts. Furthermore, in model 3 an interaction variable has been 
included with the dichotomized freshwater variable and corruption variable. In this model, 
interesting results are unveiled. In model 3 the freshwater variable now demonstrates a 
positive and significant effect of .467* on non-state conflicts for African states that have 
high levels of corruption. Further adding the effect of the freshwater variable with the 
interaction variable “Freshwater*Low_Corruption”, the results demonstrate that freshwater 
affects non-state conflicts significantly less in countries with low corruption levels, where 
                        Model:               1                         2                       3                     4 
Variables:                              
Change in freshwater           .275                    .323                  .467*              .530** 
Levels of Corruption                                      -.319*                 
Freshwater*Low_Corruption                                                  -.366*            -.472*              
GDP in Dollars                                                                                                 -.074 
% employed in Agri                                                                                        -.197 
Polity_2                                                                                                              .258* 
 
Constant                                .375*                  .494**               .375*              .653 
Number                                   48                      48                      48                    48 
Adjusted R                             .023                     .111                  .123               .190 
R square                                 .044                     .149                  .160                .276 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***<0.001                                                                                                                                        














the coefficient for these countries is .101. Lastly, in model 4 the control variables have been 
included to check for illusory correlations. In this model, the effect by the freshwater 
variable in countries with high corruption levels has increased to .530** and stayed 
significant. Additionally, calculating the effect that freshwater has on non-state conflicts in 
countries with low levels of corruption, this coefficient is 0.058. This does not entail that 
freshwater have an effect of 0.058 in low corruption countries, since the significance of this 
coefficient is unknown. But what is known is that in model 4, the effect of freshwater on 
non-state conflicts is significantly less in low corruption countries than in high corruption 




























8. Discussion and conclusion  
 
The aim of this study has been to examine whether water scarcities effect the amount of 
non-state conflicts in African states depending on their levels of corruption. A quantitative 
analysis has been carried out on 48 African countries, utilizing data on their levels of 
freshwater resources, number of domestic non-state conflicts and corruption scores within 
the time-period of 1995-2016. This study has not only aimed to fill the gap of knowledge 
regarding if corruption does have an intermediate effect on the likelihood for non-state 
conflicts to occur during water scarcity, but additionally aims to more specifically examine 
whether non-state conflicts are uniquely affected by water scarcities and corruption. Thus, 
the research question for this thesis has been; Does water scarcity affect non-state conflicts 
to different degrees in Africa depending on corruption? Additionally, the hypothesis 
attached to the research question claims; H1: As water scarcities increase, states with low 
corruption experience less non-state conflicts, whereas high corruption states experience 
more conflict. 
 
The results brought forward in this thesis partially supports the hypothesis. The findings in 
the main regression analysis demonstrate that there is no linear correlation between water 
scarcities and non-state conflicts, and that corruption does not moderate this effect. This 
implies that the hypothesis of this thesis is wrong, demonstrating that there is no continuous 
increase in non-state conflicts as freshwater decreases, and that the degree to which 
conflicts would occur as freshwater decreases does not depend on levels of corruption.  
However, in the dichotomized analysis the results instead show that where there is water 
scarcity there is also a greater likelihood of non-state conflicts to occur, and that the 
presence of conflicts depends on their levels of corruption. In other words, countries with a 
decrease in freshwater are less likely to experience non-state conflicts if they have low 
levels of corruption, than countries that have high levels of corruption. Retrieving back to 
the research question of this thesis, that asked if water scarcities affect non-state conflicts to 
different degrees depending on corruption, the answer is: Yes, water scarcities affects the 
likelihood of non-state conflicts to different degrees depending on corruption in African 
countries however not in a continuous manner.  
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In conclusion, the findings of this study have shown that where there is water scarcity and 
high levels of corruption non-state conflicts are more likely to occur. This could indicate 
that corruption is an important conditional circumstance that need to be accounted for in 
future sustainability and peace-development work. This study suggests, that equal and fair 
distribution of services and ecological distribution is important in order to prevent 
environmental conflicts from occurring. Where and how climate change will affect regions 
and countries all over the world, is unknown, however this study has demonstrated through 
conducting an analysis on water scarcities, non-state conflicts and corruption, that partial 
governments will experience greater consequences facing water scarcities. On the other 
hand, it is important to keep in mind, that many more intermediate factors are involved for 
why conflicts occur, as we have learned from previous research, from the case of Somalia 
and the case of the Senegal river. Conflicts are complicated, multidimensional and not 
easily explained trough a regression analysis. Conflicts are chaotic, confusing and deeply 
personal for the people involved and therefore need further and careful attention in order to 
be solved. Because of this, several suggestions for future research paths have been found in 
the process of writing this thesis. First, this study has aimed to measure how corruption 
levels contributes to non-state conflicts when there is water scarcity, claiming that lower 
levels of impartiality increases conflicts. However, Rothstein has provided additional 
suggestions for how to measure impartiality other than corruption, since corruption alone 
does not indicate all levels of partiality. A suggestion for future research is to deeper 
examine quality of government and how this interacts with the likelihood of environmental 
conflicts to occur, such as rule of law or bureaucratic transparency. Another suggestion is to 
look deeper into how corruption might result in increased non-state conflicts and to find 
further empirical evidence of how corruption might affect specific socio-economic or 
marginalized groups when they are affected by scarcity in natural resource scarcities. 
Lastly, another suggestion is to further examine new potential measurements of water 
scarcity that include both above ground water resources and underground water resources, 




In closing, this thesis suggests that an increased focus on climate change and environmental 
degradation is vital when working towards a more secure and peaceful world. Additionally, 
this study proposes that countries facing water scarcities, must aim to conduct fair and 
equal governance for all citizens of all ethnic and social groups, for the purpose of 
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1. Algeria                           25.  Lesotho          
2. Angola                           26.  Liberia                   
3. Benin                             27.   Libya 
4. Botswana                       28.   Madagascar     
5. Burkina Faso                 29.   Malawi          
6. Burundi                         30.   Mali 
7. Cameroon                      31.   Mauritania                
8. Cape Verde                    32.   Mauritius        
9. Central African Rep      33.   Morocco                    
10. Chad                              34.   Mozambique 
11. Comoros                        35.   Namibia            
12. Congo, Dem. rep           36.    Niger                  
13. Congo, Rep                    37.   Nigeria       
14. Cote d’Ivoire                  38.   Rwanda 
15. Djibouti                          39.   Senegal 
16. Egypt                              40.   Sierra Leone 
17. Equatorial Guinea          41.   Somalia  
18. Eswatini                         42.   South Africa 
19. Gabon                            43.   Tanzania 
20. Gambia                          44.   Togo 
21. Ghana                            45.   Tunisia 
22. Guinea                           46.   Uganda  
23. Guinea-Bissau               47.   Zambia 
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